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This paper finds that firms’ trade credit, the financing provided by upstream input suppliers along
the supply chain, plays an important role in determining firms’ exportation. In a panel data set of
manufacturing firms in 25 Eastern European and Central Asian countries between 2001 and 2007,
we employ international trade cost shocks to identify the causal impacts of trade credit on firms’
exportation. We find that when trade costs decline, firms with less trade credit increase their exports
disproportionately more because of the alleviation of their financing burdens. Results are robust after
controlling for bank and other financing channels, country financial development, and the endogeneity
of trade credit. Our findings contribute to the empirical identification of financial frictions on firms’
exports, and to the role of trade credit on firms’ performance.
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1 Introduction
Opening to international markets can help host countries improve productivity and speed up economic
growth. These facts stimulate the increasing need to understand export-accelerating channels. A
number of studies find that firms’ financing conditions have impacts on their exportation.1 This paper
investigates the impacts of a specific financing channel, trade credit, which is the financing provided
by upstream input suppliers along the supply chain.
We assume that firms are heterogenous in productivity and face export costs, and that firms face
financial frictions. Therefore, firms export if their productivity is above the zero-export-profit thresh-
old. The productivity threshold is higher for firms with less trade credit because these firms have more
financing difficulties. We propose that decreases in export costs will have disproportionate impacts on
firms with less trade credit, because these firms’ financing burdens are alleviated asymmetrically more.
We employ a panel data set of manufacturing firms in 25 Eastern European and Central Asian
countries from 2001 to 2007 in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, combined with industry-level
international trade cost data from the United Nation Comtrade database. Enterprise Surveys data set
has two advantages. First, it has trade credit measures at the firm level. Second, countries in the data
are similar in economic background but have experienced various export cost changes, which allows us
to observe firms’ differentiated export behavior.
Several findings stand out. First, we focus on firms’ probability of exportation and find that the
impacts of decreased trade costs are disproportionately high for firms with less trade credit, because
trade liberalizations reduce their burdens in financing export costs systematically more. Second, we
find similar impacts on trade volume for exporters. We employ the Heckman model to correct for the
possible bias caused by firms’ self-selection of export. Finally, our results are robust after incorporating
firms’ financing from banks and other channels and the country’s financial development, and after
controlling for the possible endogeneity of trade credit.
This paper first contributes to the empirical identification of the impacts of financial frictions
on firms’ exports. As pointed out by Manova (2008), regressing firms’ financial conditions on their
exportation may only indicate the correlation, not the casuality. Manova (2008) uses the exogeneous
equity market liberalization to control for the endogeneity of firms’ financing conditions. Employing
the exogenous changes in export costs, this paper finds that firms with less trade credit increase
their exports disproportionately more after trade liberalization, which identifies the causal impacts
of financial frictions on exportation. Second, this paper contributes to the literature of trade credit.
A series of finance papers have examined the reasons for the provision of trade credit by upstream
1See Berman and Hericourt (2010) and Manova (2008).
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suppliers.2 This paper examines the role of trade credit in financing firms’ exportation.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and constructs the
empirical framework. Section 3 displays benchmark results and robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Framework
Data
The data set consists of two parts. The first part includes 1,620 firm–year observations in 11
manufacturing industries in 25 Eastern European and Central Asian countries from 2001 to 2007,
collected by the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.3 The World Bank has surveyed each firm two (three)
times every three years in every country and the data set is a balanced panel. On average, exporters
are more productive, larger, older, have higher shares of foreign ownership, and have more trade credit.
The second part constructs industry-level export costs. Following Bernard et al.(2006), we proxy
the ad valorem export costs as the sum of tariffs and transportation costs at the industry level,
which is the most disaggregated level given the data limitation. Tariffs are extracted from the World
Bank Consolidated Tariff Schedules database. Transportation costs are measured as the ratio of
the cost-insurance-freight over free-on-board values for bilateral trade pairs from the United Nation
Comtrade database. For every country-industry-year triplet, we average its export costs across different
destinations. The average trade costs for all countries have decreased from 19.1% in 2001, to 14.2% in
2004, and to 12.0% in 2007.
Hypotheses and the Empirical Framework
We propose hypotheses based on two trends of literature: (i) only the productive firms export.
Melitz (2003) assumes that firms are heterogeneous in productivity and pay fixed and variable costs to
export. In the equilibrium, firms export if their productivity is above a zero-export-profit threshold.
(ii) In an imperfect financial market, firms that are able to finance their export costs can export, as
in Manova (2008). Fisman and Love (2003) point out that trade credit may ease firms’ financing
difficulties. Following the two trends in the literature, we postulate that declines in export costs will
increase export profits, reduce the productivity threshold for exporting, and therefore increase firms’
exports. These effects are more pronounced for firms with lower trade credit, because their financing
burdens are alleviated more. We propose Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predict firms’ export probability
2See Fisman and Love (2003), Cunat (2007) and Klapper et al. (2012).
325 countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak, Slovenia, Tajik-
istan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 11 manufacturing industries include food, textiles, garments, chemicals, plastics
and rubber, non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, electronics,
and other manufacturing.
3
Trade Credit, International Trade Costs and Exports
and volume respectively.
Hypothesis 1 Declines in international trade costs increase firms’ export probability; these effects
are more pronounced for firms with lower trade credit.
Hypothesis 2 Declines in international trade costs increase export volume for existing exporters;
these effects are more pronounced for firms with lower trade credit.
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we estimate:
pijct = 1[αp + βptcostjct + γptcreditijct + δptcostjct × tcreditijct
+ λpZijct + dj + dc + dt + νijct > 0], (1)
where pijct is a dummy which equals 1 if firm i in industry j in country c in year t exports, 0 otherwise.
tcostjct is the export cost. tcreditijct is the trade credit measured by a share of intermediate goods
financed by delayed payments from suppliers. The control vector Zijct includes employment, firm age,
labor productivity relative to industry mean4, and a foreign ownership dummy which equals 1 if a
firm has at least 10% of foreign ownership and 0 otherwise, as in Javorcik (2004). dj , dc, and dt are
industry, country, and year dummies respectively, and νijct is the error term. Following Berman and
Hericourt (2010), we estimate (1) by the random-effects panel logit model, because the insufficient
time spanning of firms (2 or 3 observations per firm) does not allow us to include firms’ fixed effects.
The coefficients we focus on are βp, γp and δp. We expect that βp < 0 because lower export costs
result in more exporting firms, γp > 0 because trade credit may help to finance export costs, and
δp > 0 because the impacts of trade costs are disproportional large for firms with less trade credit.
Following Melitz et al. (2008), we test Hypothesis 2 by estimating a Heckman model in Heckman
(1979), which corrects for firms’ self-selection bias. Specifically, the export volume vijct is observed
only when firms export: pijct = 1. If the error term for trade volume, µijct, is correlated with νijct in
(1): E(µ|ν) = aν, firms’ self-selection of exportation will affect the estimation of export volume. Then
the Heckman model is:
E[ln(vijct)|pijct = 1] = αv + βvtcostjct + γvtcreditijct + δvtcostjct × tcreditijct
+ λvZijct + dj + dc + dt + aΞijct, (2)
where Ξijct is the inverse Mills ratio that summarizes the self-selection effect.
5 We estimate the
Heckman model in two stages. In the first stage, we re-estimate (1) with two additional variables that
4Results are robust if using total factor productivity but the number of observations is reduced by 60% because of missing
capital.
5Assume ν in (1) follows a distribution Φ(ν), E(µ|ν, p = 1) = aE(ν|ν > −βx) = aφ(βx)/Φ(βx) = aΞ.
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affect fixed cost of export, and therefore the export probability only. One is whether firms have a
quality certificate, another is whether firms use emails and web sites, and both affect fixed export costs
from information barriers. The second stage estimates (2). Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. We are interested in coefficients βv, γv and δv,and expect βv < 0, γv > 0 and δv > 0 as in (1).
3 Results
Benchmark Results
Table 1, columns 1 and 2 display the estimation of (1). Results confirm that firms with less
trade credit engage disproportionably more into exportation because trade liberalizations lesson their
financing difficulties more. Table 2, columns 1 and 2 display the results for firms’ export volume in
estimating (2). Take column 2 for instance, facing one percentage point decrease in trade costs, a firm
with no trade credit will increase export by 1.57% more than a firm with the trade credit ratio of 50%.
Robustness Check 1: Financing from Banks and Other Channels and Financial Development
Besides trade credit, firms may also acquire financing from banks and other channels. We add three
variables to control for alternative financing channels—the first is a dummy of whether firms consider
access to finance as a moderate to major obstacle, following Eck et al. (2012), the second is firms’
loans from banks divided by total sales, and the third is a dummy of whether firms have financing from
their buyers through cash in advance.6 Similarly, a country’s financial development may also impact
firms’ export. We measure financial development as the ratio of private credit over GDP from Beck et
al. (2010), and add its interaction with trade credit in regressions. Columns 3 and 4 in Tables 1 and
2 respectively confirm that the benchmark results still hold after controlling for firms’ bank financing
and the aggregate financial development.
Robustness check 2: The Endogeneity of Trade Credit
Firms’s trade credit may not be fully determined by input suppliers but may also be affected by
their relationship with input suppliers and their financial conditions, as in Klapper et al. (2012).
We employ the instrument variable method to correct for the possible endogeneity. Specifically, we
choose two instruments that are correlated with firms’ trade credit but not with their export decisions.
The first instrument is firms’ sales prior to three years, which is not correlated with firms’ current
shocks that may affect exportation, but correlated firms’ need for trade credit as in Cunat (2007).
The second instrument is firms’ share of internal funds in financing investment, which measures their
liquidity. Cunat (2007) finds that firms with lower liquidity obtain more trade credit. Columns 5 and
6 in Tables 1 and 2 show that benchmark results are qualitatively the same after controlling for the
6Due to data limitation, the dummy of financing from buyers is for firms’ general sales.
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endogeneity of trade credit. The Cragg-Donald F statistics pass the weak instrument test and the
Sargan statistics indicate that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
4 Conclusion
This paper finds that declines in trade costs induce exports disproportionately more for firms with less
trade credit, which implies that trade credit is an important determinant of firms’ exports through the
financing channel. Our results are robust after incorporating firms’ financing from banks and other
channels and the country’s financial development, and after correcting for the possible endogeneity of
trade credit. Even though we focus on the decrease in export costs, our results also imply that firms
with more trade credit can perform better with higher trade costs, because they have more financing
channels to cushion sudden cost shocks. Our results suggest that policy makers may focus on policies
that can provide firms broader and cheaper channels of financing in order to foster export growth.
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Table 1: The Impacts of International Trade Costs and Trade Credit on Export Probability
Dependent Variable: Export Probability
Benchmark Other Finance Endogeneity
Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Cost – −9.462∗∗∗ −8.346∗∗∗ −2.213∗∗∗
(2.463) (2.287) (0.552)
Trade Credit + 1.853∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗ 2.348∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(0.345) (0.403) (0.434) (0.488) (0.191)
T. Cost*T. Credit + 9.092∗ 4.387∗∗ 4.605∗∗∗
(4.805) (2.198) (1.253)
Fin. Development 2.915∗∗ 2.386
(1.466) (1.496)
Fin. Dev.*T.Credit −4.451∗∗∗ −4.212∗∗∗
(1.475) (1.493)
Fin. Obstacle −0.226 −0.189
(0.214) (0.220)
Bank Loan/Sales 3.341∗∗ 3.121∗∗
(1.470) (1.469)
Fin. from Buyers 0.135 0.173
(0.288) (0.292)
Productivity 0.366∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.030 0.033
(0.093) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.022) (0.021)
Ln(Employment) 0.831∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.099) (0.101) (0.104) (0.015) (0.015)
Age 0.012∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
FDI Firm 0.936∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.336) (0.350) (0.368) (0.047) (0.048)
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.135 0.139 0.148
Chi-squared 129.25 130.3 128.31 124.39
Cragg-Donald F 26.504 25.896
Sargan Stat. 0.023 0.044
Observations 1,612 1,570 1,528 1,497 927 906
The instruments in (5) and (6) are firms’ sale three years before and their liquidity.
– Industry, country and year dummies are included.
– ***, **, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 2: The Impacts of International Trade Costs and Trade Credit on Export Volume
Dependent Variable: Export Volume
Benchmark Other Finance Endogeneity
Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Cost – −5.149∗∗∗ −5.105∗∗ −20.118∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.387) (5.030)
Trade Credit + 1.497∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗ 2.348∗∗∗ 0.924∗ 23.941∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.220) (0.434) (0.571) (4.150)
T. Cost*T. Credit + 3.659∗∗ 3.365∗ 56.106∗∗∗
(1.819) (1.923) (16.072)
Fin. Development 2.915∗∗ 4.358∗∗∗
(1.466) (1.516)
Fin. Dev.*T.Credit −4.451∗∗∗ −0.419
(1.475) (2.294)
Fin. Obstacle −0.226 −0.511∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.187)
Bank Loan/Sales 3.341∗∗ 2.445∗∗∗
(1.470) (0.777)
Fin. from Buyers −0.104 0.016
(0.207) (0.221)
Productivity 0.860∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.073) (0.097) (0.094) (0.517) (0.395)
Ln(Employment) 0.711∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗ 2.589∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.088) (0.101) (0.133) (0.342) (0.261)
Age −0.004 −0.008 0.019∗∗∗ −0.006 0.009 0.022
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.024) (0.018)
FDI Firm −0.289 −0.297 1.141∗∗∗ −0.154 2.412∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.312) (0.350) (0.305) (1.087) (0.851)
Inverse Mills Ratio −1.208∗∗ −0.947∗∗∗ −1.794∗∗∗ −0.442
(0.511) (0.489) (0.332) (0.873)
R-squared 0.399 0.419 0.420 0.447 0.413 0.385
Cragg-Donald F 27.686 46.676
Sargan Stat. 0.336 2.047
Observations 959 660 766 660 707 660
– In (1) to (4) Heckman models, the first stage exclusive variables are dummies of whether firms have quality certificate,
and online communication tools.
– The instruments in (5) and (6) are firms’ sale three years before and their liquidity.
– Industry, country and year dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
– ***, **, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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